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(RMI Consultants)
Since Independence, the contribution of Swazi smallholder farmers to sugar production has 
grown greatly. This is in part due to a change in the political support that the farmers have 
received from the Swazi state. Initially viewed with suspicion and as a challenge to royal 
hegemony, smallholder sugar cane production is now seen as a crucial means of overcoming 
rural poverty in Swaziland’s poorest region, the semi-arid lowveld. Provision of irrigation 
water is vital for successful sugar cane production on the co-operatively managed farms that 
are necessary to achieve the economies of scale in irrigated sugar production. Threats to 
their profitability arising from increasingly volatile markets facing Swaziland’s sugar industry 
since changes to the EU Sugar Protocol in 2005 undermine their capacity for co-operative 
governance and challenge their long-term viability. EU support to facilitate adjustment to the 
new sugar market has led to increased sugar cane production by smallholders. The paper argues 
that the two big dam projects that are at the heart of the new irrigation regions are politically 
‘too big to fail’, which has committed the Swazi state to the long-term support of smallholders 
to ensure repayment of loans to build the dams. At the same time, the success of commercial 
small-scale sugar cane production poses challenges to the Swazi model of customary land 
tenure. Although emblematic of autocratic royal power, it also – in the processes of land and 
water development for commercial smallholder sugar cane production – suggests limits to 
how that power may be deployed in the changing relationships between Swazi elites and their 
corporate partners and the diverse classes of rural stakeholders.
Introduction
Since the mid-1950s the Swaziland sugar industry has expanded rapidly. Although the smallest 
southern African state, by the early 1980s Swaziland had the second largest sugar industry in 
the region after South Africa, and, by 2014–15, the fourth largest in Africa. Over the past 20 
years the sugar industry has remained Swaziland’s pre-eminent economic activity. By 2014–15 
it accounted for almost 60 per cent of agricultural output, 35 per cent of agricultural wage 
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employment, and contributed about 18 per cent to Swaziland’s GDP.1 In addition, although 
agriculture contributed less than 10 per cent of GDP, manufacturing, dominated by sugar 
processing, accounted for over 42 per cent.2
Whilst the industry remains predominantly based upon large-scale estate production 
(responsible for 77 per cent of production in 2012–133), there has been long-term involvement 
by Swazi smallholders, who have been incorporated into the industry from a subsistence or 
semi-subsistence agriculture. Since 2000, this has accelerated as large-scale irrigation projects 
dependent upon two dams have enabled thousands of farmers, who formerly relied on rain-
fed practices, to consolidate their individual farms into commercial irrigated sugar cane 
co-operatives. During this period, the area under sugar cane has grown by 28 per cent, most of 
which is due to smallholder expansion.
A primary aim of this paper is to explore the role of Swazi smallholders in the sugar industry 
and their relationship with economic, political and social factors encountered in Africa’s last 
absolute monarchy.4 In particular, we examine the significance of sugar for the Swazi monarchy, 
which is seeking to re-establish its control over two-thirds of its pre-colonial land from which 
the 1907 British land proclamation had excluded it. As well as reasserting its control through 
incorporation of previously settler-owned property, title deed land, as Swazi Nation Land 
(SNL), the Swazi monarchy needed also to negotiate its control of the institutions of the chiefs5 
who controlled local access to SNL under customary tenure.6 A second aim of the paper is 
to the evaluate the role of the sugar industry within Swaziland’s agricultural development 
policies,7 following the World Bank’s rediscovery of the central importance of agriculture as 
the most effective means of overcoming deep-seated poverty.8 In recent years, such studies have 
emphasised the role of market forces and the encouragement of an entrepreneurial spirit among 
African smallholders as being a crucial element in successful rural development policies,9 while 
downplaying the processes of social and economic differentiation that produce winners and 
 1  US Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, ‘Swaziland: Sugar Annual – The Supply and Demand 
of Sugar in Swaziland’. GAIN Report, 20 April (2015). Available at http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20
Publications/Sugar%20Annual_Pretoria_Swaziland_4-20-2015.pdf, retrieved 24 November 2015.
 2  A. Mafusire and F. Leigh, ‘Swaziland 2014’, www.africaneceonomicoutlook.org (African Development Bank, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and United Nations Development Programme, 2014). 
Available at http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Swaziland_
EN.pdf, retrieved 24 November 2015.
 3  US Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, ‘Swaziland: Sugar Annual – The Report 
Covers Supply and Demand Trends for Sugar in Swaziland’. GAIN Report, 17 April (2013). Available at 
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Sugar%20Annual_Pretoria_Swaziland_4-17-2013.
pdf, retrieved 14 December 2015.
 4  Between 1973 and 2005, the king ruled by decree. The king presides over a relatively small group of Swazi 
aristocrats, and may only be selected from the Royal Dlamini clan. The chiefs are a hereditary key traditional 
institution whereby the king exerts direct control over those of his subjects who live on customary tenured Swazi 
Nation Land.
 5  Approximately 200 chiefs govern customary tenured Swazi Nation Land: see Business International 
Corporation, Vuvulane Irrigated Farms: A Sugar Production Venture in Swaziland (undated). Available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAY230.pdf, retrieved 7 December 2015.
 6  M. Neocosmos, ‘The Agrarian Question in Swaziland’, in M. Neocosmos (ed.), Social Relations in Rural 
Swaziland (Kwaluseni, Social Science Research Unit, University of Swaziland, 1987).
 7  S. Wiggins, ‘Presidential Address African Agricultural Development: Lessons and Challenges’, Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 65, 3 (2014), 529–56.
 8  World Bank, World Development Report: Agriculture for Development (Washington, DC, World Bank, 2008).
 9  T. Reardon, D. Tschirley, B. Minten, S. Haggblade, P. Timmer, and S. Liverpool-Tasie, ‘The Emerging “Quiet 
Revolution” in African Agrifood Systems’, Brief for Harnessing Innovation for African Agriculture and Food Systems: 
Meeting Challenges and Designing for the 21st Century (Addis Ababa, African Union, 25–26 November 2013); 
S. Wiggins, S., Keats, and J. Sumberg, ‘Agricultural Growth in the New Alliance Countries’, Working Paper (Future 
Agricultures Consortium, 2014, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton). Available at: 
www.future-agricultures.org, retrieved 24 November 2015); International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), Rural Poverty Report (Rome, IFAD, 2011).
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losers from the transition to capitalist agriculture.10 We examine the impact of these political and 
economic processes with respect to the incorporation of smallholders within the sugar industry 
over the past 50 years. The approach we take is chronological, but focusing on three questions:
First, in what ways has smallholder incorporation differed over time, and how has this been 
manifested in social and economic relations, including the development of a distinctive labour 
market within the smallholder sector?
Second, how has incorporation affected political relations between smallholders, the ruling 
elite, including the king and traditional leaders (the chiefs), paying particular attention to the 
impact on rights to customary tenured land?
Third, to what extent has the expansion of the smallholder sugar sector reflected international 
markets and Swaziland’s relationships with its major international trading partners, especially 
the EU?
The paper is based upon a review of secondary materials including academic, official and 
industry-based reports and plans. It involves a retrospective analysis of past research undertaken 
over a period of 20 years by both authors in their roles as independent researchers, analysts 
working within the Ministry of Agriculture, and as internal and external community support 
workers on the Komati Downstream Development Project (KDDP) and the Lower Usuthu 
Development Project (LUSIP). One of the authors currently works with Swazi smallholders 
in the sugar industry and is based in the northern sugar belt, providing a continuing local 
insight into recent developments, particularly with respect to contemporary political economy.
The remainder of this paper traces the development of smallholder sugar production within 
Swaziland. It argues that an initial phase of large-scale estate production failed to address 
widespread rural poverty, prompting political pressure for wider distribution of sugar cane 
wealth. A combination of factors, including regional water resource management and changing 
international markets, have also prompted expansion of sugar cane areas via smallholder 
schemes. However, the major investments that were necessary for this approach to succeed, 
particularly extending irrigation onto customary tenured SNL, create a combination of political 
and economic commitments that make smallholder sugar cane production politically too big 
to fail, linking its fate to the political elite, including the monarchy.
The Geography of the Swaziland Sugar Industry and the Importance of 
Land Tenure
Between 1957 and 1980, Swaziland’s sugar industry represented a classic, capital-intensive 
agri-industrial complex funded by external capital within the colonial and postcolonial 
systems. Three clusters of large-scale estate sugar cane production are centred on Swaziland’s 
three sugar mills: Ubombo on the Usuthu river; Mhlume, serviced by an 88-km canal from 
the Komati river via the Sand River dam; and Simunye, dependent on the Mnjoli dam on the 
Black Mbuluzi river (Figure 1). All are located in the semi-arid lowveld, where irrigation is 
crucial for successful production. In explaining the pattern of development within the industry 
it is necessary to identify the various types of land tenure that exist in Swaziland. Two main 
types of land tenure resulted from the British colonial administration’s efforts in 1907 to end 
uncertainty over land rights due to overlapping land concessions granted to white colonists 
by the Swazi king. ‘Title deed land’ (TDL), held by settlers and companies, diminished from 
62 to 28 per cent of total land during the course of the twentieth century due to acquisitions 
by the Swazi monarchy. SNL was land under customary tenure controlled by the king via 
the chiefs. SNL is held by the king ‘in trust for the nation’,11 and the proportion of land in 
 10  M. Mamdani, ‘Contradictory Class Perspectives on the Question of Democracy: The Case of Uganda’, in P. 
Anyang’ Nyong’o (ed.), Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa (London, Zed Books, 1988).
 11  R. Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens: Land and Power in Swaziland (Johannesburg, Witwatersrand 
University Press, 2001), p. 115.
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Figure 1.  Main features of the Swaziland sugar industry. Source: Paul Satchell, University of the West of England.
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this category has increased since the early twentieth century (Table 1). In practice, two types 
of SNL exist:
 (i)  SNL held under customary tenure cannot be bought, mortgaged, leased or sold. The chiefs 
have the power to allocate land to homestead heads on land under their control. It can be 
acquired through inheritance or kukhonta; that is, by pledging allegiance to the chief. The 
chiefs’ subjects receive usufruct rights to land, but the administrative rights remain with 
the king. By 2000, it covered about 55 per cent of the country and supported about 80,000 
homesteads (approximately 600,000 people, 62 per cent of the total population).12
(ii)  The remainder of SNL includes land transferred from TDL and has been leased out to 
commercial enterprises, managed by the government of Swaziland13 or controlled by 
Tibiyo Taka Ngwane (Tibiyo), the Royal Swazi investment fund,14 becoming the central 
mechanism of domestic capital formation.15
A third category, Crown Land, is owned by the Swaziland government. It covers less than 
0.4 per cent of Swaziland and is insignificant in the sugar industry.
The early sugar cane estates were developed on TDL: British and South African capital 
developed the Ubombo ranches complex on TDL in the central lowveld supplying the Big 
Bend (Ubombo) sugar mill. In 1958, in the northern lowveld, the second cluster commenced 
when the Colonial (now Commonwealth) Development Corporation (CDC) and JL Hulett 
started production at their Mhlume sugar estate on TDL, processing its first sugar in 1960. After 
Independence, the expanding industry provided a vehicle for investment and land acquisition 
by the Swazi monarchy.
In 1968, King Sobhuza established Tibiyo as an investment fund following the reversion of 
mineral rights to the king ‘in trust’ for the nation.16 Because of shortages of domestic capital, 
Tibiyo sought partnerships with foreign capital, through joint investment in new projects and 
the acquisition of shares in companies, including those in the sugar industry. The focus was on 
 12  E. van Waveren, ‘Land Pressure and Customary Tenure: Cropland Allocations in Swaziland’, Natural Resources 
Forum 31 (2007), pp. 188–97.
 13  The government of Swaziland represents the modern administrative structure. It is made up of the cabinet, the 
bicameral parliament and the ministries. The prime minister heads the cabinet and is appointed by the king. 
Under the 2006 constitution, the kingdom of Swaziland is an absolute monarchy. The monarch appoints the 
prime minister, approves the cabinet, and can veto legislation and dissolve parliament. Under the tinkhundla 
(tribal or community committees) electoral system, introduced in 1978 and amended in 1993 and 2005, there 
is a bicameral parliament. The House of Assembly has up to 65 members, ten (including at least five women) 
appointed by the monarch and 55 elected by universal adult suffrage from a list provided by the tinkhundla. The 
Senate has up to 30 members, with ten chosen by the House of Assembly (including at least five women) and 
20 by the monarch (at least eight women). In each of the 55 tinkhundla, numerous candidates are nominated 
by show of hands; these are then reduced in secret ballots to three candidates per tinkhundla. The 55 assembly 
members are elected in a general election. The 2006 constitution made provision for an independent judiciary 
and for human rights, including freedom of assembly and association, but made no reference to political parties 
(http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/swaziland/constitution-politics, retrieved 5 December 2015).
 14  A. Remmelzwaal and J.D. Vilakati, Land Tenure Map of Swaziland, Project FAO SWA 89/001 (Mbabane, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Co-operatives, 1994).
 15  Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens, p. 7.
 16  Section 91, Swaziland Independence Constitution.
Table 1. Changes to Swazi National Land Tenure 1907–1997 (% of Swaziland)
In 1997, title deed land extended over a further 27.6 per cent of the country, with 0.4 per cent under Crown Land. Source: E. van 
Waveren, ‘Land Resource Distribution under Customary Tenure in Swaziland: A Geographic Analysis with Special Attention to Semi-
arid Land’ (PhD thesis, University of the West of England, Bristol, Faculty of the Built Environment, 2003).
SNL customary tenure SNL other
1907 land partition 38 0
1968 Independence 49 2
1997 53 19
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the purchase of TDL, which boosted the percentage of SNL, but much of this was no longer 
under the control of chiefs. This non-customary type of SNL expanded from 2 per cent to 19 
per cent of Swaziland by 1997. Much of it was developed for sugar cane, in association with 
CDC and other agri-businesses. Therefore, the de facto position was the creation of new large-
scale estates where traditional authorities, other than the king, had little or no direct influence. 
Therefore, it has 
provided the material basis for the transformation of the entire social structure of Swaziland by 
providing the aristocracy with an independent basis for capital accumulation. Through involvement 
in Tibiyo, Swazis with both royal and non-royal origin found themselves part of a new elite club.17
The expansion of sugar was a relatively new form of rural development for Swaziland, 
the first joint deal to develop land with CDC having been in the forestry sector.18 In the 
first four decades this policy had little to do with poverty alleviation, although wages, 
housing and other social services provided by the sugar estates enabled a good standard of 
living for estate workers compared to other rural dwellers. However, the development of 
Simunye,19 the third sugar mill, and associated estates on SNL resulted in the forced removal 
of approximately 5,000 people. Levin notes that it was surprising how limited resistance 
to this was. This possibly reflected the sense of powerlessness of people residing on SNL 
in the face of coercive power exercised by the king through his control of the chiefs. This 
has taken the form of forced labour, forced financial contributions20 and forced removal 
of groups considered to be either a threat to royal power or a barrier to Tibiyo-sponsored 
development.21 The Royal Swazi Sugar Corporation (RSSC) was formed as a consequence 
of Simunye’s development and both Tibiyo and the state, through the Swazi government, 
were major shareholders. Since 1973, when King Sobhuza suspended the constitution, the 
government has had limited powers. In 1978 the tinkhundla system was introduced, a form 
of limited democracy under which the king assumed ‘supreme power’.22 Through this system, 
parliament became restricted to political forces approved by the king, and its members are 
not allowed to monitor Tibiyo’s funds.
Although compensation and suitable land and housing were supposed to be provided as 
Simunye was developed,23 in practice little attention was paid to the expelled families, who lost 
access to valuable land and water rights. The result was impoverishment for many, and a decline 
in food security, only partly compensated for some by employment on the newly established 
sugar complex.24 In all these areas, the key to the expansion of the sugar industry had been 
the development of water resources, with most of the newly irrigated areas on TDL or Tibiyo-
acquired SNL. As a consequence of Tibiyo’s activities, by 1994, 34 per cent of cane growing 
and 50 per cent of milling operations had come into Swazi ownership, the majority of which 
is under direct royal control and not under the supervision of the government.25 It is against 
this broader political and economic context that we now consider the evolution of smallholder 
production of sugar cane.
 17  Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens, p. 148.
 18  Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens.
 19  See Royal Swazi Sugar Corporation, ‘Company History’, 2014. Available at http://www.rssc.co.sz/about_us/
company_history/, retrieved 27 April 2016.
 20  Informal cash tributes rather than tribute labour to chiefs had already become more common at the end of the 
nineteenth century because of the increasing loss of labour to the regional capitalist labour market (see Levin, 
When the Sleeping Grass Awakens, p. ).
 21  Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens.
 22  Ibid., p. 101.
 23  S.J.F. Winn, ‘An Introduction to Simunye Sugar Estate’, Proceedings of the South African Sugar Technologists’ 
Association (June 1979), pp. 66–9. (Mount Edgecombe, RSA, SASTA, 1979).
 24  Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens.
 25  Swaziland Sugar Association, Annual Review (Mbabane, Swaziland Sugar Association, 1993).
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The Evolution of the Smallholder Sector in the Sugar Industry
Phase 1: Vuvulane Irrigated Farms 1962–1990
In 1962, CDC instigated a smallholder project, Vuvulane Irrigated Farms (VIF), whose 25726 
farmers supplied its Mhlume mill from 1,203 ha of TDL within the CDC concession.27 By joining 
the scheme, settler farmers obtained 20-year leasehold title to their farm, a major departure from 
the traditional relationship between land and farmer as it had evolved on SNL. The farmers were 
contracted to commit 70 per cent of the land to sugar cane.28 VIF was supported by the colonial 
commissioner, who was keen to provide opportunities for ‘enlightened’ Swazi farmers to benefit 
directly in the rapidly expanding and profitable sugar industry. This mindset may be traced back 
to ‘the same concept of “improvement” … [as that] used by British colonial agricultural officers 
in their many attempts to force Africans to adopt modern farming in the 1930s and 40s’.29
However, VIF was associated with considerable political upheaval. In 1972, one of its 
farmers was elected to parliament as a member of the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress, 
which ‘represented an alliance between the middle class, the working class and segments of 
the peasantry’.30 Despite the economic success of the scheme,31 this was perceived as a serious 
challenge to traditional authorities and ultimately the king. Subsequently, no further smallholder 
developments on TDL were permitted, as the concept of ‘extending freehold rights to peasants 
challenges the authority of chiefs and hence the very foundation stones of royal hegemony’.32 
By 1982, legal title had been transferred to the Swaziland National Agricultural Development 
Corporation (SNADC) and the land reverted to SNL, although CDC was retained as manager. 
This triggered further unrest, as farmers were still required to pay rents on what had, from their 
perspective, become SNL, where traditionally no rent is paid. However, SNADC did not accept 
this argument and continued to insist that rents be paid. In 1986, Tibiyo acquired ownership. 
The effect of this was that until the early 1990s, no further attempt was made to incorporate 
Swazi smallholders into the sugar industry, which continued to be dominated by a small group 
of large-scale miller-cum-growers and large commercial growers (Table 2).33
 26  By December 2015 the number of VIF farmers had risen to 284 (RSSC personal communication to M. Ogg, 5 
December 2015).
 27  S.L. Atkins and A. Terry, ‘The Economics of Sugar Cane Production in the Northern Lowveld of Swaziland’, 
Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, 34, 3 (1995), 224–47.
 28  Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens.
 29  P.E. Peters, ‘Land Appropriation, Surplus People and a Battle over Visions of Agrarian Futures in Africa, The 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 40, 3 (2013), 537–62.
 30  Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens, p. 64
 31  J.R. Tucket, ‘Vuvulane Irrigated Farms, Swaziland: A Report on the First Ten Years’, Agricultural Administration, 
4, 2 (1977), 79–97.
 32  Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens, p.134.
 33  A. Terry, ‘Extending Participation in the Swaziland Sugar Industry: Patterns and Prospects’, The Singapore 
Journal of Tropical Geography, 18, 2 (1997), 196–210.
Table 2. Size and structure of the sugar industry, 1990
In 1995, IYSIS and MHLUME had amalgamated.1 This reduced the number of growers in the 1,000 – <5,000 hectare category by 2, 
and increased the 5,000+ hectare category by 1. Source: Swaziland Sugar Association Newsletter, March 1994. IYSIS (Inyoni Yami 
Swaziland Irrigation Scheme) was a large agribusiness located in Tshaneni in the northern Lowveld. In 1995 it amalgamated its sugar 
estate with the Mhlume (Swaziland) Sugar Company Limited miller-cum-grower to form the IYSIS/MSCo Sugar Partnership.
Size (ha) Number of growers Area under sugar cane 
production (ha)
Proportion of total area 
under production (%)
<100 263 1,655 4.4
100 – <1,000 10 2,443 6.6
1,000 – <5,000 8 17,359 46.7
5,000+ 2 15,723 42.3
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By 1994, the three miller-cum-growers controlled 65.5 per cent of the sugar cane area. 
A further six large-scale commercial growers controlled 23.4 per cent of the total. Sixteen 
smaller commercial estates, each less than 1,000 ha, controlled 8.1 per cent. In contrast, VIF’s 
257 growers, representing 98 per cent of the growers, controlled only 3 per cent of the sugar 
cane area. The total output of VIF was insignificant compared to the whole industry and was 
incorporated into Swaziland’s Commonwealth Sugar Quota that lasted until the end of 1974, 
replaced by the EU’s Lomé Sugar Protocol when the UK joined the European Economic 
Community, the forerunner of the EU.
Phase 2: ‘Schedule D’ Growers 1991–1999
Changing political and economic circumstances prompted a return to sugar cane expansion 
through smallholders. Swaziland’s Fourth National Development Plan (1983–84) argued that 
large-scale commercial developments on SNL such as Simunye were no longer appropriate 
for future investment in the sugar industry as they had created little employment relative to 
the scale of investment.34 The consequence of this decision was to switch the focus for further 
expansion onto SNL smallholders.
In 1991, the Swaziland Sugar Association (SSA), which since 1967 had controlled the sale 
of sugar from all Swaziland’s producers, set aside 10,000 tonnes of sugar quota for smallholder 
growers. This was 9 per cent of the Swazi Lomé Sugar Protocol Quota. This smallholder sugar 
allocation, termed the ‘Schedule D’ quota, was initially not taken up enthusiastically. Charles35 
cited lack of knowledge of the industry, lack of finance and inadequate technical backing as 
inhibiting factors, although Funnell36 and de Vletter37 demonstrated the willingness of such 
farmers to innovate. However, the pace of expansion increased after 1993 as the profitability 
of sugar production became apparent. By 1994, 692 ha of sugar cane had been planted by 
Schedule D growers, representing 2 per cent of that year’s national total (Table 3). Distribution 
between the three mill groups was uneven: 17 of the 20 farmers’ associations (FAs), operating 
either as smallholder shareholder companies or, in a few cases, individual growers, supplied 
the Ubombo Mill group, while none supplied Simunye.38
By 1995, the Schedule D quota had been increased to 15,000 tonnes, reflecting the growing 
interest being shown. This was in part caused by a decline in off-farm income opportunities 
within South Africa between 1993 and 1996, during which time the number of Swazis employed 
 34  Government of Swaziland, Fourth National Development Plan 1983/84–87/88, Mbabane, Government of 
Swaziland Printer, 1983).
 35  R. Charles, Proposal for the Nyakatfo Sugar Cane Development (Mhlume, Swaziland Sugar Company Ltd., 1995).
 36  D.C. Funnell, ‘The Quiet Innovators: Small Scale Irrigation on Swazi Nation Land’, in H.J. Tieleman (ed.), 
Scenes of Change: Visions on Developments in Swaziland, Research Report No. 33 (Leiden, African Studies 
Centre, 1986), pp. 121–36.
 37  F. de Vletter, ‘Innovation and Communal Land Tenure in Swaziland: A Case Study of Smallholder Irrigation 
Schemes on Swazi Nation Land’, in H.J. Tieleman (ed.), Scenes of Change: Visions on Developments in Swaziland, 
Research Report No. 33 (Leiden, African Studies Centre, 1988), pp. 78–90.
 38  Swaziland Sugar Association, Annual Review (Mbabane, Swaziland Sugar Association, 1997).
Table 3. ‘Schedule D’ quota holders and applicants, December 1994
*Assuming 10.7 tonnes of sugar quota per hectare.
Source: Swaziland Sugar Association Extension Service.
Quota holders who 
had planted
Quota holders who 
had not planted
Applicants awaiting 
water permit
Total
Associations 17 11 21 49
Members 212 207 not applicable 419
Cane area (ha) 692 571 972 2,235
Quota (tonnes) 7,210 6,150 10,400* 23,760
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in South African mines declined by 26 per cent.39 This contributed to growing political and 
economic tensions, as many of the unemployed returned to their farms. The increasing 
profitability of sugar, the decline in off-farm incomes and the concentration of ownership of 
the sugar industry by the political elite changed the political-economic dynamics and stimulated 
the smallholder sector – a major turnaround from the post-VIF situation. During this period 
all the major stakeholders began to see their interests align behind the policy of encouraging 
increased sugar production, from whatever source.40 However, in contrast to the early phase 
of VIF, SNL smallholder sugar cane production remained under the control of the chiefs and, 
via them, the king. Of equal importance was the fact that this emerging group of richer Swazi 
sugar cane farmers did not create a distinctive political movement and seemed to be supportive 
of the status quo that was beginning to deliver them substantial economic benefits.
Differentiation among Schedule D Growers
The 692 ha of land that had been allocated a sugar cane quota and which had been planted in 
1994 was entitled to produce 7,210 tonnes of sugar at the premium price. The 212 members 
of the Schedule D FAs earned a net income on sugar of E1,785 (US$624) per ha per annum, 
compared with an average of E800 (US$280) per ha per annum for dryland cotton, then the 
most important alternative cash crop for lowveld smallholders. This raised incomes by 123 per 
cent,41 exacerbating the social and economic differentiation within SNL.42
This model of rural development was, moreover, unable to meet the challenges faced by most 
people on SNL. Farmers had to be close to a perennial water source, a river, canal or reservoir, 
and generally within 30 km of the mill. Even if they were in the correct location, the complicated 
process of applying for a quota inhibited individuals and groups from moving into sugar. The 
financing of the loans was also daunting, given the cost of installing irrigation equipment. In 
practice, the smallholder sector was heterogeneous. In 1994, excluding the 21 FAs without a 
water permit, without which irrigation could not be obtained, the Ubombo group contained 83 
per cent of the FAs, but only 56 per cent of the total membership, reflecting the fact that seven 
‘FAs’ were composed of a single member and only four FAs contained more than 20 members. 
Although the average area per FA was 37.8 ha, the average of 4.1 ha of cane per grower was 
similar to the average of 4.5 ha for VIF growers.43 Areas farmed by individual FAs varied from 
8 ha to 146 ha, with a majority of FAs farming 20 to 50 ha, only one being greater than 100 ha.
Although the Schedule D farmers generated twice as many permanent jobs per ha as on larger 
estates, wages were lower and there was no provision of housing, education or health services.44 
To a certain extent, these FAs were using poorer neighbours as reservoirs of cheap labour. 
This exploitation of non-FA members has persisted, and is also apparent on VIF,45 as most 
of the better-paid employment tends to be assigned to family members, leaving the seasonal, 
unskilled, low-paid work to others. This has led to a feeling of alienation of non-FA members. 
For example, only 16 per cent of non-FA members of the Nyakatfo community claimed they 
had benefited from the Komati Pilot Project ten years after it had been implemented, whilst 60 
per cent claimed no impact and 20 per cent stated it had had a negative impact.46 Developments 
such as the Komati Pilot Project and VIF have led to greater class differentiation within rural 
 39  Central Statistical Office (CSO), Annual Report (Mbabane, Government of Swaziland, 1998).
 40  A. Terry, ‘Who Benefits from Rural Development Projects? A Case Study of the Komati Pilot Project, Swaziland’, 
South African Geographical Journal 83, 1 (2001), pp. 18–27.
 41  Terry, ‘Extending participation in the Swaziland Sugar Industry’.
 42  D.C. Funnell, Under the Shadow of Apartheid: Agrarian Transformation in Swaziland (Aldershot, Avebury, 1991).
 43  Terry, ‘Extending participation in the Swaziland Sugar Industry’.
 44  Ibid.
 45  Swazi Media Commentary, ‘Swazi King Wants 10pc of Coca-Cola’, available at http://allafrica.com/
stories/201511051775.html, retrieved 8 December 2015.
 46  A. Terry, ‘Evaluating the Green Revolution after a Decade: A Swaziland Case Study’, International Journal of 
Agricultural Sustainability, 10, 2 (2012), pp. 135–49.
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communities,47 as a consequence of richer smallholders exploiting poorer neighbours when 
employing them as agricultural labourers, resulting in accumulation from below. 48
Smallholders and the Swazi State
The Schedule D farmers lacked relevant agronomic and managerial skills, and most had little 
experience of working communally. Consequently, the Ubombo and Mhlume miller-cum-
growers needed to provide them with extension support. Traditionally, the industry had been the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Development rather than the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives, whose extension workers had no experience of sugar cane production. This 
reflected the fact that the agriculture ministry’s remit was to support farmers on SNL, not 
TDL. As the number of SNL-based sugar cane farmers increased, this required the agriculture 
ministry to provide extension support, which proved to be a major challenge49 and led to greater 
political involvement in the sector during its next phase of expansion, with the creation of the 
Swaziland Agricultural and Development Enterprise (SWADE).
The closed structure of the sugar cane market had a profound impact on the relationship of 
smallholders to institutions of capital and the state. Given that all Schedule D growers farmed 
SNL and had no title deed to the land allocated to them, they would have found it extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a loan to fund capital development. The structure of the 
sugar industry was therefore crucial in enabling FAs to gain access to credit. The mill provided 
a guaranteed market for the product and was responsible for distributing the ‘sugar cheque’ to 
the growers (as they called it) and, as a consequence, credit was provided to farmers on SNL.50 
As the number of FAs expanded, development finance institutions (DFIs) such as the Swaziland 
Investment and Development Corporation, the Enterprise Trust Fund and Swazi Bank began to 
play a greater role in lending. Under the proviso that the newly established FAs or individual 
had acquired a quota to grow sugar, had a licence to extract water and occupied land suitable 
to grow the cane, and that the mill would oversee sugar cane husbandry on the newly created 
farms, the DFIs were willing to lend.
Although there was a sense of optimism around most Schedule D initiatives, FAs were at risk 
through poor husbandry, and the variability in yields between them could be high.51 However, 
these developments were politically popular because the government and the king were keen 
that the financial benefits of the sugar industry should be spread more widely, as the scale and 
depth of rural poverty began to be recognised.52 Extra sugar also added to the profitability of 
the mills in which the king, via Tibiyo, was a major shareholder.
The role of sugar in supporting wider rural development was pointed out by UNCTAD 
who stated that 
In the Government’s opinion, a major benefit of the increased sugar production would be the 
resulting investment in infrastructure, particularly irrigation facilities. Income from sugar would 
pay for the investment, which – if sugar production eventually becomes less profitable in, say, 15 
years – could be used for other crops.53
 47  H. Bernstein, ‘Agrarian Classes in Capitalist Development’, in L. Sklair (ed.), Capitalism and Development 
(London, Routledge, 1994), 40–71.
 48  M. Neocosmos, The Agrarian Question in Southern Africa and Accumulation from Below (Uppsala, Scandinavian 
Institute of African Studies, 1993).
 49  A. Terry, A Baseline Survey and Monitoring and Evaluation Scheme for the Komati Pilot Project, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Co-operatives (Mbabane, Government of Swaziland, 1997).
 50  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Policies for Small-Scale Sugar Growing 
in Swaziland, UNCTAD/ITCD/COM/28 (UNCTAD, 13 March 2000). Available at: unctad.org/en/Docs/
poitcdcomd28.en.pdf, retrieved 10 February 2015.
 51  Atkins and Terry, ‘The Economics of Sugar Cane Production in the Northern Lowveld of Swaziland’.
 52  A. Terry, ‘Who Benefits From Rural Development Projects?’
 53  UNCTAD, Policies for Small-Scale Sugar Growing in Swaziland, p. 6.
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Smallholders were to pay for the infrastructure, but could only access funds by growing sugar 
cane. Because sugar was the crop with a guaranteed market, it made sense to encourage farmers 
to enter the industry which would provide, along with government extension services and 
those from the private sector, the skills necessary for the new producers to become successful 
co-operative irrigated sugar cane farmers. However, it was also believed that, once established, 
the infrastructure of dams, in-field irrigation systems and improved roads and bridges, would 
facilitate a more resilient rural economy, even if sugar cane were later displaced by other 
crops. Sugar was thus argued to be a means to an end, not the end itself. Concurrently, from 
the perspective of the millers, including Tibiyo, as they made investments in milling capacity 
to process extra sugar cane, it was in their interest to keep the new growers in the industry. 
These concepts became the foundation upon which the next phase of smallholder incorporation 
was built.
Phase 3: Community-Driven Development: The Komati Downstream Development Project 
and the Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation Project 1999–2009
By the end of the 1990s the expansion of smallholder production of sugar cane was clearly 
established as the only option if the industry was to expand. The lack of suitable TDL for sugar 
cane production and the availability of suitable soils on SNL near the mills, coupled with the 
negative publicity associated with the expulsion of communities during the creation of Simunye, 
meant that expansion via large-scale estate production was no longer politically acceptable. 
The growing awareness of the breadth and depth of poverty on SNL also provided a stimulus 
to incorporate smallholders into the industry,54 especially as most schemes were profitable and 
had raised rural incomes of the FA members substantially. Therefore new developments would 
have a dual purpose: to promote expansion of the sugar industry and to tackle poverty through 
commercialisation of the subsistence farm sector. From the perspective of the king, this could 
be achieved without the need for land reform and therefore without relinquishing the power 
he held over the farmers via the chiefs. This was only possible if sugar was adopted because 
no other agricultural product was marketed through a closed system. However, despite the 
success of most Schedule D farmers, their national impact was tiny: in 1997 they represented 
only 0.5 per cent of SNL households.55
Accordingly, the National Development Strategy (1999) priorities included the shift of 
smallholder farmers from rain-fed maize subsistence farming to irrigation-based, commercial 
sugar cane production,56 supported enthusiastically by the king.57 Overall, the SNL smallholder 
sector is the largest contributor to the livelihoods of the majority of the population.58 The major 
constraint until the early twenty-first century was the lack of irrigation water, as the dry season 
run-of-river flows had already been fully allocated to existing farmers. This was to be addressed 
by two large-scale developments associated with dams on the Komati and Usuthu rivers: the 
Komati Downstream Development Project (KDDP) and the Lower Usuthu Irrigation Project 
(LUSIP). The lead organisation in these developments is SWADE.
The creation of SWADE in 1999 (originally Swaziland Komati Project Enterprise) was an 
important event in the development of irrigated sugar cane on a large scale on SNL. SWADE’s 
role was to provide the missing social and technical elements of support identified during the 
 54  World Bank, Swaziland: Reducing Poverty through Shared Growth (Washington, DC, World Bank, 2000).
 55  E. van Waveren, ‘Land Resource Distribution under Customary Tenure in Swaziland: A Geographic Analysis 
with Special Attention to Semi-Arid Land’ (PhD thesis, University of the West of England, Bristol, Faculty of 
the Built Environment, 2003).
 56  Government of Swaziland, Swaziland National Development Strategy (Mbabane, Ministry for Economic Planning 
and Development, Government of Swaziland, 1999).
 57  UNCTAD, Policies for Small-Scale Sugar Growing in Swaziland.
 58  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ‘Swaziland looks to a revitalized agriculture sector’, p. 1, 
http://www.fao.org/in-action/swaziland-looks-to-a-revitalized-agriculture-sector/en/, retrieved 8 May 2016.
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previous decade. These included first, a development philosophy of community empowerment 
and knowledge transfer. Second, this was complemented with technical and financial advice 
to facilitate change from subsistence rain-fed agriculture to co-operatively managed irrigated 
commercial agriculture. The ultimate goal was the creation of independent businesses, placing 
SWADE’s philosophy squarely in the market-led approach to rural development.
The scale of the KDDP and LUSIP projects dwarfed any previous SNL initiatives and due 
to their size held considerable risks, even in the benign international trading regime in which 
Swaziland’s sugar industry had evolved.59 Kerr and McDonald estimated that the EU Sugar 
Protocol premium price had resulted in an income transfer worth 6.97 per cent of GDP to the 
Swaziland economy, compared with 0.56 per cent for Malawi and 0.24 per cent for Zimbabwe.60 
Nonetheless, considerable job reductions had already occurred on the large estates before the 
KDDP and LUSIP projects commenced, as some of them merged to achieve economies of 
scale.61 In the event, in 2003 a successful challenge to the Sugar Protocol by Australia, Brazil 
and Thailand within the World Trade Organization set in train a reform of the internal EU sugar 
market that undermined Swaziland’s expansion strategy and demonstrated the overreliance of 
the KDDP and LUSIP on the sugar industry as the main income generator. This in turn exposed 
the FAs when they were most vulnerable to financial shocks, whilst learning new managerial, 
agronomic and financial skills.
Swaziland was identified as one of the country’s most at risk from changes to the Sugar 
Protocol.62 The first stage of the EU reform in 2006 resulted in a 36 per cent reduction in the 
EU price by 2009–10, hitting Swaziland harder than any of the other countries in the region. 
In 2007 the EU established a new regime to support African, Caribbean and Pacific group 
(ACP) sugar exporters,63 the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol countries (AMSP), 
to be implemented through the National Adaptation Strategy (NAS)64. However, methods used 
to support different sections of Swaziland’s sugar industry led to the creation of winners and 
losers, even within the smallholder groups on the two projects,65 and, although the recovery of 
world sugar prices by 2010 enabled all FAs to survive, those with high levels of debt had earned 
too little to enable dividends to be distributed to members. The two projects must therefore be 
considered in the context of this economic shock and the measures put in place by the EU and 
other agencies to enable the industry to become more competitive in a liberalised sugar market.
The Komati Downstream Development Project
Had Swaziland not begun construction of the Maguga dam in 1998, it is likely that South Africa 
would have claimed this shared water resource by building a dam on the Komati river upstream 
of Maguga.66 This would not only have prevented an extension of irrigation onto SNL, but also 
threatened the Mhlume sugar mill and its sugar cane suppliers. Paradoxically, at the time that 
the decision to go ahead with the project was taken, there was considerable uncertainty about 
 59  A. Terry, ‘The Sustainability of the Sugar Industry in the Northern Lowveld of Swaziland: The Case of the Maguga 
Dam, The South African Geographical Journal (Special Edition, 1997), 195–98.
 60  J. Kerr and S. McDonald, ‘Developed Country Sugar Policies and the ACP Countries’ (Paper presented to the 
Agricultural Economics Society Annual Conference, Exeter University, 1994).
 61  P. Richardson-Ngwenya and B. Richardson, ‘Aid for Trade and African Agriculture: The Bittersweet Case of 
Swazi Sugar’, Review of African Political Economy, 41, 140 (June 2014), 201–15.
 62  B. Garside, T. Hills, J.C. Marques, C. Seeger and V. Theil, Who Gains from Sugar Quotas?, ODI-LSE DESTIN 
DV406 Research Project (London, Overseas Development Institute, 2005).
 63  Richardson-Ngwenya and Richardson, ‘Aid for Trade and African Agriculture’.
 64  The National Adaptation Strategy (2006) is a Government of Swaziland document which was to act as 
‘a mitigation measure against the negative effects on the sugar industry and the wider economy that will 
result from the reform of the European Union (EU) sugar market’. Executive Summary, p. ii, available at: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/swaziland/documents/eu_swaziland/nationaladaptationstrategy.pdf, 
retrieved 8 May 2016.
 65  Richardson-Ngwenya and Richardson, ‘Aid for Trade and African Agriculture’.
 66  Terry, ‘The Sustainability of the Sugar Industry in the Northern Lowveld of Swaziland’.
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the viability of similar projects in South Africa due to the enormous capital costs.67 However, 
the international context was one of general optimism about the prospects for the industry and 
a belief that Swaziland could not allow this opportunity to develop the impoverished northern 
lowveld to slip away.
The KDDP, established in 2000, was originally envisaged to provide irrigation to 7,400 ha 
of SNL, with 5,500 ha under sugar cane and 1,900 ha to fruit and vegetables. 14,500 people 
were expected to benefit within the project area.68 The KDDP is made up of three elements: 
the Maguga dam, the Agricultural Project Area and the expansion of the Mhlume sugar mill. 
Whilst the cost of the Maguga dam was shared between the governments of Swaziland and 
South Africa on a 40:60 ratio, the in-field developments were funded by the farmers. SWADE 
and the sugar miller assisted the FAs with land development, design and installation of irrigation 
systems. The FAs in the KDDP area are located near to the Komati river, from which irrigation 
water is pumped. Later FAs were created that incorporated, amongst others, those communities 
that had been displaced by the Simunye sugar scheme over 20 years earlier and who, when 
production of sugar cane commenced, began to supply the Simunye sugar mill.
The cost of the expansion of the Mhlume mill was borne by RSSC. Originally scheduled for 
completion in 2006, this was postponed to 2013 due to drought and lack of finance.69 By March 
2010, 2,500 smallholders were cultivating 3,095 ha of irrigated land in the Komati Basin – 51 
per cent of the original target – with approximately 90 per cent under sugar cane and the rest 
under vegetables and other field crops.70 Smallholders, most of who are within the KDDP, 
supplied 52 per cent of sugar cane processed by Mhlume and 25 per cent of that by Simunye. 
The smallholders were members of 29 FAs, ranging from 37 to 220 members, with an average 
membership of 86.71 Compared to 1990, the industry in the northern lowveld had undergone 
a profound structural change, with important ramifications for the politics of sugar in the 
country.
The Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation Project
The LUSIP’s objective was ‘the reduction of poverty and sustained improvement in the 
standard of living of the population in the Lower Usuthu Basin through commercialisation 
and intensification of agriculture’.72 This contrasted with the KDDP’s initial objectives, which 
had principally been wealth generation, though by 2007, it was realised that the KDDP also 
needed to address issues of deep-seated poverty, resulting in more effort to diversify production, 
promote home gardens and improve potable water and sanitation to the scheme members.73 This 
demonstrated a flexible approach throughout the policy cycle, a factor identified as important 
in successful rural development projects.74,75
The LUSIP commenced in 2003 with the start of the construction of three dams forming an 
off-river reservoir impounding water diverted from wet season flows in the Usuthu river. The 
project is designed to irrigate 11,500 ha. Of the 6,500 ha to be completed in Phase 1, around 
 67  Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), A Sugar Commodity Perspective (Midrand, DBSA, 1993).
 68  Swaziland Water and Development Enterprise (SWADE), Socio Economic Survey: Analytical Report (Mbabane, 
Government of Swaziland, 2009).
 69  SWADE, ‘What is the Komati Downstream Development Project (KDDP)?’, available at http://www.swade.co.sz/
index.php/2012-08-29-08-07-22/kddp, retrieved 15 November 2014.
 70  SWADE, Socio Economic Survey: Analytical Report.
 71  Ibid.
 72  IFAD/SWADE, Project Completion Report (Mbabane, Government of Swaziland Publisher, 2014), p. viii.
 73  SWADE, ‘What is the Komati Downstream Development Project (KDDP)?’
 74  A. Dorward, F. Shenggen, J. Kydd, H. Lofgren, J. Morrison, C. Poulton, N. Rao, L. Smith, H. Tchale, S. Thorat, 
I. Urey and P. Wobst, ‘Institutions and Policies for Pro-Poor Agricultural Growth’, Development Policy Review 
22, 6 (2004), pp. 611–22.
 75  A. Rahman and J. Westley, ‘The Challenge of Ending Rural Poverty’, Development Policy Review 19, 4 (2001), 
pp. 553–62.
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51 per cent was achieved, comprising 3,050 ha of sugar cane and 321 ha of alternative crops. 
By May 2014, 15,202 people had benefited directly, with a further 5,277 benefiting indirectly.76
Development of the project was ‘extraordinarily difficult’77 mainly due to the protracted 
negotiations with traditional authorities to try to bring about a more equitable distribution of 
the benefits to all in the project area than had been the case in the earlier phases of the KDDP, 
though the extent to which this has been achieved has been questioned.78 In addition, significant 
redesign of the upstream works added to delays, resulting in the final cost being one and a half 
times the original estimate.79 The Swaziland government contributed 55 per cent of the total 
funds, with the remainder coming from eight other funders. Three per cent was contributed by 
the beneficiaries.80 The expansion of the Ubombo sugar mill was paid by Illovo, at the time a 
South African transnational corporation and largest sugar producer in Africa, now 100 per cent 
owned by Associated British Foods.81 For both the KDDP and the LUSIP, the vast majority of 
farmers viewed the prospect of joining the schemes with great enthusiasm, whilst the chiefs 
were also highly supportive. A new alliance had been struck, with the king, and associated 
business interests along with traditional leaders, backing smallholder production in the heavily 
subsidised, supportive market environment of the time.
Phase 4: Financial Support in Response to Decreasing Prices: 2007–2013
In 2006, the KDDP and the LUSIP were at different stages of development as the first EU price 
shock hit the industry. By September 2005, the KDDP had developed 14 of the 29 FAs. However, 
even before the EU price reduction, only one was able to service the loans due to an appreciation 
of the South African rand against the US dollar and the euro, causing the sugar price to fall 25 
per cent below the financially viable level, although by 2010 it had recovered to 12.5 per cent 
above it.82 As the LUSIP reservoir did not fill up until the 2009 wet season, its smallholders 
were not affected directly as their farms had yet to commence producing sugar cane.83
Given the increasingly challenging economic conditions facing FAs, the EU and the 
Swaziland government introduced grants to enable new farmers to start up production, mainly 
of sugar cane. An important element of EU support was the ‘Smallholder Irrigation Project’ 
(SHIP) that ran from May 2009 until November 201384 and, by 2014, had provided grants to 
32 FAs (59 per cent) in the southern area and six (17 per cent) in the north. A further 16 FAs 
under the KDDP were retrospectively provided with credits equivalent to grants received by 
the later FAs.85 FAs were provided with grants to cover 70–75 per cent of development costs as 
part of the EU’s AMSP Aid for Trade package.86 Without this support, few of the FAs on either 
project would have become financially viable, and continued insecurity undermined trust within 
the FAs and compromised co-operative management. The government recognised that if the 
FAs foundered, one of its main instruments for achieving rural development would collapse, 
with major implications for government finances dependent upon a positive income flow from 
 76  IFAD/SWADE, Project Completion Report.
 77  Ibid. p. ix.
 78  L. Similane, Participation of the Previously Landless in Farmer Companies under the LUSIP Project in Swaziland 
(Masters Dissertation, Graduate School of Public and Development Management, Faculty of Commerce, Law 
and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2014).
 79  IFAD/SWADE, Project Completion Report.
 80  Ibid.
 81  Illovo, ‘Group Overview’, available at https://www.illovosugar.co.za/About-Us/Group-Overview, retrieved 8 May 
2016; Associated British Foods, ‘Acquisition of Illovo Minority Interest Update’ (ABF, May 2016), available at 
http://www.abf.co.uk/media/news/2016/acquisition_of_illovo_minority_interest_update, retrieved 31 May 2016.
 82  A. Terry, ‘The Komati Downstream Development Project: Achievements and Challenges’, Tijdschrift voor 
Economische en Sociale Geografie, 98, 5 (2007), 641–51.
 83  IFAD/SWADE, Project Completion Report.
 84  Ibid.
 85  National Adaptation Strategy Technical Assistance (NAS TA) Business Unit, Business Sector Analysis (BSA) 
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 86  Richardson-Ngwenya and Richardson, ‘Aid for Trade and African Agriculture’.
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the FAs to service the loans used to finance the two schemes. The EU and Swazi government 
grants were therefore recognition of the financial and social catastrophe that would ensue if 
both projects were to fail, threatening the political alliance around smallholder support that had 
been built. The political imperative of supporting the smallholder sugar sector was paramount.
The Economic Impact of Sugar Production on Farmers’ Associations
In 2013, the National Adaptation Strategy Technical Assistance (NAS TA) Business Unit 
published a study87 of 89 FAs (out of a total of 105) supplying Ubombo Mill in the south, and 
Mhlume in the north. The results showed similar sugar cane areas per member (1.64 and 1.66 
ha per member) although southern FAs were less than half the size (averaging 39 members 
and 63 ha per group, compared to 89 members and 147 ha in the north). In each case about 
half of the FAs had no residual debt. This had transformed the situation facing the KDDP 
associations compared to 2005, and ensured that the LUSIP associations were not faced with 
the same huge debt repayments at an early stage of their development. Had the EU and Swazi 
government grants not been available, the lack of competition between DFIs would have been 
a critical factor in preventing FAs from benefiting from the recovering sugar prices. The NAS 
TA study noted that: 
On the whole, the level of indebtedness of the farming companies is very low … many companies 
with no or modest debt and a few companies with an excessive debt burden. This situation has been 
greatly assisted by the EU and [Swazi government] grant scheme and the KDDP rebate. However, 
due to the higher price paid for sugar from 2011 many of the FAs which were developed under 
100 per cent loan finance have also managed to become debt free.88
The average profitability per FA member was US$3,418, 14.3 per cent higher than 
Swaziland’s GNI per capita of US$2,990 in 2014,89 and represented a sixfold increase in 
average incomes within the lowveld since 2007.90 The most profitable FA earned US$12, 272 
per member, four times the national average in 2014, which demonstrates the potential of 
well-managed FAs to deliver huge benefits to their members. However, the worst performing 
FA made a loss of US$291 per member in the same year. Operational, rather than financial, 
factors seemed to be the main weaknesses within FAs. This has been explained by a failure to 
replant cane ratoons91 in a timely fashion, leading to a reduction in yield, demonstrating that 
even long-established FAs face challenges, but of a different type than newly established ones. 
The NAS TA report concluded that: 
The most critical factor that determines success is the quality of governance. The best performing 
FAs comprise a mixture of both small and large farms and demonstrate the common characteristics 
of being open, democratic companies with memberships that are fully engaged and informed on 
the workings of their companies.92
Smallholder Sugar Cane Production and the Swazi State
The political importance of the smallholder sugar sector is apparent at a number of levels 
within Swaziland’s dual political system. Two of SWADE’s former managers have become 
Swazi government cabinet ministers. Individuals from within FAs are leaders in the SSA and 
 87  NAS TA Business Unit, Business Sector Analysis (BSA) 2013/14.
 88  Ibid., p. 38.
 89  World Bank, ‘Data – Swaziland’ (World Bank website). Available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/swaziland, 
retrieved 9 May 2015.
 90  Atkins, S., ‘Investment Decisions and Rural Poverty: An Appraisal of the Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation 
Project in Swaziland’ (PhD thesis, University of the West of England, Bristol, 2007).
 91  The practice of growing a crop from the stubble of a previous crop rather than replanting every season. This 
reduces cultivation costs, but after a period of time, yields will fall, so complete replanting has to be undertaken.
 92  NAS TA Business Unit, Business Sector Analysis (BSA) 2013/14, p. 39.
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sit on sugar planter and mill group boards, ensuring that the smallholder sector is represented 
in bodies previously dominated by agri-businesses. Within the KDDP, 19 FAs have formed ‘the 
Federation’, which has taken the lead in raising production efficiencies, as well as engaging 
proactively with the Fairtrade Foundation in a sugar scheme. The Federation operates outside 
the sugar industry’s established structures and therefore represents a radical departure from the 
industry status quo, possibly reflecting a willingness of some FAs to embrace a more liberal 
market as an opportunity, rather than being constrained by the SSA closed market.
The role of the chiefs remains, as it was during the Schedule D period, essentially reactive. 
No chiefs are FA chairpersons, even if FA committee members, and they rarely intervene 
directly in management, other than to mediate in disputes. Since this would happen in any 
case, the extension of the sugar industry onto SNL has not substantially altered the relationship 
between chiefs and their subjects. Given the importance of internal governance as a determinant 
of FA profitability, the role of the chief in settling disputes quickly and encouraging frequent, 
well-attended meetings with transparent decision-making may be important. Some FAs have 
agreed to continue the traditional practice of paying the chief a tithe in the form of cash; although 
it is unclear how popular this is or whether individual FA members would risk objecting to the 
practice. Where chieftaincies overlap geographically, chiefs may be the cause of instability 
either between chiefs or their subjects. One such dispute held up the Komati Pilot Project by 
three years,93 but all have been resolved within the customary institution.
As with the rise of Schedule D farmers, the spread of FAs on the KDDP and LUSIP projects 
has not been accompanied by any increase in political activism amongst FA members, either 
as an identifiable interest group or through the emergence of strong political leadership. 
Therefore, the FAs have not created a challenge to traditional authorities, which suggests that 
most members see themselves as winners from the developments, especially when compared to 
the poverty experienced before the schemes were implemented. This seems to have strengthened 
their conservativism, and they remain staunch supporters of the tinkhundla system, helped by 
the financial support they received during the EU transition period.
The challenges facing the FAs now that the majority of loans have been paid off will be 
different, but still pose a risk to their continued operations. The FA leadership is faced with 
a number of different pressures in the utilisation of profits. There is growing demand among 
shareholders to increase dividends as their lifestyles improve.94 There is also pressure to invest 
in the farm infrastructure as this comes to the end of its useful life. The complexities of these 
issues demonstrate the difficulties that face the sugar industry stakeholders. With such a large 
and rapid increase in small businesses, and with these facing a much more challenging market 
than was the case for the first 50 years of the sugar industry in Swaziland, it will be more difficult 
to predict and control events. This has political implications for the king and the government. 
These economic changes have been achieved without land reform. In theory, the relationship 
between the king and his subjects has therefore remained unchanged. However, given the higher 
value of land and the level of investment in it by the farmers, it may be problematic in practice 
for chiefs to exercise their formal power to remove individual farmers from the land, even in 
a political system where the king has become increasingly autocratic.
Smallholders and International Markets
Most FAs have become successful producers of sugar cane and achieved significant increases 
in income, and it appears therefore that the strategy of extending smallholder sugar production 
to SNL has been justified. For example, over half the FAs have cleared their long-term debts.95 
 93  Terry, A Baseline Survey and Monitoring and Evaluation Scheme for the Komati Pilot Project.
 94  For example, see Terry, ‘Evaluating the Green Revolution after a Decade’, for an idea of how increased wealth 
has affected housing and transport standards of members of the Komati Pilot Project.
 95  NAS TA Business Unit, Business Sector Analysis (BSA) 2013/14.
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However, given the changes to the EU internal sugar beet market from October 2015, if supplies 
to the EU sugar market were to increase, they would be faced with: 
a situation of increased competition between raw cane sugar suppliers on the EU market … in the 
context of a substantial decline in EU sugar prices … This will fundamentally change the economics 
of ACP cane-sugar trade with the EU.96
As a consequence, ACP producers were urged to seek new diversified markets that would 
become available within the EU, including higher value-sugars, Fairtrade-certified or value-
added sugar products. The response, according to the ACP–EU joint institution Technical Centre 
for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation (CTA), should be market driven.97 These policies have 
been strongly promoted within Swaziland’s NAS and could have a positive impact on FAs, 
who are already responding. There may also be further possibilities for the Swaziland sugar 
industry and its FAs. Since the 2006 reform, the EU has changed from being a net exporter to a 
net importer of sugar. In addition, CTA notes that ‘European companies have increased imports 
of white sugar from ACP states (e.g. Mauritius and Swaziland), as a strategic response to the 
reform’.98 This helps to explain the decision of EU-based companies to invest in ACP countries 
who they judge could take advantage of the more liberal EU sugar market, and the increasing 
interest in the whole region by sugar refining companies such as Associated British Foods.99 
However, expiry of EU sugar quotas in 2015/16 is predicted to lead to a slight decline in imports 
from low-cost countries such as Swaziland to the EU market,100 so there continues to be little 
certainty with respect to access to the EU market beyond that time, with the likely outcome that 
Swaziland will become more dependent upon regional markets, which tend to be more volatile.
Conclusion
Two dynamics may be discerned in the Swazi sugar industry. First, from the perspective of 
investors, the key question relates to future profitability. Even after incorporating a large group 
of smallholders, Swaziland is ranked as one of the ten lowest-cost producers of sugar in the 
world.101 With respect to the smallholder sector, although the NAS TA Business Unit report102 
is positive about the current position of the FAs, it notes that relatively small changes in price 
and costs would result in a drop in profitability of approximately 44 per cent for FAs.103 The 
volatility of incomes in a post-EU Sugar Protocol market is a major challenge to the whole 
industry, but more so to FAs, where it could have a negative impact on group cohesion and 
co-operative governance with implications for profitability.
The challenge to the profitability of the FAs has further implications for a second key 
dynamic, namely the relationship between the king, the government and smallholders. The 
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king and government have gained substantially from ownership and rents derived from the 
estate sector, including the sugar mills, but the development of the industry suggests a need 
to co-opt a smallholder sector to sustain political legitimacy. In the late 1990s, the success of 
the Schedule D FAs, in addition to the increasing difficulties facing the established estates 
in increasing output, provided an opportunity for the king and the government to support 
expansion of irrigated sugar cane to SNL. The sugar industry provides the only market that 
enables farmers without title deed to acquire credit to finance investment on their farms. That 
this coincided with an increasing awareness of the depth and breadth of rural poverty on SNL 
made the decision to invest in the KDDP and the LUSIP doubly attractive to the king and the 
government, as it provided evidence of action to address rural poverty at a time when the king 
was facing challenges by opponents concerned about the growing inequalities and political 
repression within the country. The government has taken a major gamble that the FAs will be 
profitable enough to repay huge loans to finance the dams, although the unpalatable alternative 
would have been the loss of the water, vital to underpinning agricultural investment and reducing 
rural poverty on SNL in the lowveld, to South Africa.
The government’s strategy has been put at risk by changes to the EU sugar market and it 
is only through lengthy and expensive intervention by the EU and the Swaziland government 
that FAs have managed to survive. However, since 2010, there are signs that the FAs can be 
made competitive, but relatively small changes in prices or costs can have major impacts on 
profitability. These dynamics raise questions about the reaction of farmers to a sustained fall 
in the profitability of sugar. If, as was the case under similar circumstances in the mid-2000s, 
farmers sought to diversify to other crops,104 this would have serious implications for capacity 
utilisation in the sugar mills and their ability to supply income to their shareholders, including 
the king and the government. It would also have implications for the creditworthiness of the 
FAs, as financing institutions would no longer be able to retrieve credit repayments at the mill 
as deductions from income from sugar cane deliveries by the FA members. Such a scenario 
could be seen as a challenge to the power of the king who granted the land to produce sugar 
and who, in theory, could remove FA members through his continued control of SNL via the 
chiefs. The practicalities of this are questionable, because many chiefs may now be in a rather 
ambivalent position as most are either FA members or are receiving enhanced tithes, but also 
because expropriating the higher value of land and other fixed assets now controlled by FAs is 
likely to meet stiff opposition and social disruption. Notwithstanding that a large number of FA 
members are older men who have traditionally been loyal supporters of the king, such support 
may be dependent upon that system continuing to deliver the economic advancement that has 
transformed their lives in the past decade. The investments made by FA members might prove 
to be worth fighting for if they were seen to be at risk from coercive practices that have in the 
past been used by traditional authorities.
The sugar industry’s payment arrangements were key to enabling large areas of low-
productivity lowveld SNL to be transformed from a region where absolute poverty was the 
norm to one where communities have received potable water, improved sanitation and improved 
food security.105 This, coupled with the training provided by SWADE (which focused on holistic 
business skills development), means that even if the sugar industry eventually declines, long-
term benefits should continue, although any alternative use of the land will need to generate 
sufficient income to reinvest in worn-out irrigation equipment and other capital investment on 
the farms.106
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The relative size of the sugar industry in the Swazi economy highlights its major role in 
the politics of land and state formation in Swaziland. In this paper we have identified how the 
increasing importance of ‘smallholder’ sugar cane production is a key marker of changes in the 
balance of those politics. In particular, the development of sugar cane production in Swaziland 
has seen its transformation from a vehicle for income and capital accumulation uniquely 
benefiting a small elite associated with ownership and management of estate production to 
an industry notionally improving the livelihoods of a mass of small-scale farmers. Central to 
this change is the customary land tenure system of SNL, which on the one hand symbolises 
autocratic royal power but also, in the processes of land and water development for commercial 
smallholder sugar cane production, suggests limits to that power and an altered terrain on which 
Swazi elites and corporate partners must negotiate with the diverse classes of rural stakeholders. 
How these negotiations are resolved will be one of the key political legacies of the decision to 
support smallholder sugar production on SNL.
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